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State Standing to Constrain the President
F. Andrew Hessick* and William P. Marshall**
Ambition, as it turns out, has not been able to counteract
ambition.1 Or at least this has been true when the ambition that
was supposed to be countered was that of the President of the
United States and the institution doing the countering was the
United States Congress. Presidential ambitions now consistently
overwhelm those of the Congress with the result that the power
of the presidency has now become far greater than the framers
may have imagined—both in absolute and in relative terms.2 As
far back as 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
Justice Jackson observed that the president “exerts a leverage
upon those who are supposed to check and balance his
power which often cancels their effectiveness.”3 Subsequent
developments have only served to increase the president’s
leverage since that time.
Perhaps because it has recognized this reality, the Supreme
Court in recent years has become notably less sympathetic to the
notion that it should defer to the vagaries of the political
wrangling between Congress and the Executive.4 Consequently,
the Court has become more active in reviewing separation of
powers disputes.5 This does not mean the Court always rules

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. We’d like to thank
Tom Campbell for his helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Josh Roquemore for his
research assistance.
1 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Y ALE L.J. 1725,
1816–18 (1996).
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
4 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196–97 (2012) (rejecting
the argument that recognition of foreign sovereigns is a political question not subject to
judicial review) [hereinafter Zivotofsky I]; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000)
(per curiam) (resolving dispute about presidential electors instead of leaving the matter to
Congress as prescribed by Article II).
5 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding
that the legislature cannot infringe on the president’s sole power to recognize other
sovereigns and nations) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.
Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014) (ruling that the president exceeded his authority by appointing
a member to the National Labor Relations Board under the Recess Appointments Clause).
*
**
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against the Executive.6 In fact, many of the Court’s recent cases
have upheld the exercise of federal executive power against
separation of powers challenges.7 It does mean, however, that the
Court has rejected the premise that political processes alone can
protect against separation of powers encroachments. The Court,
in short, has sent the message that it is ready to actively police
structural constitutional issues.8
Against this background, it may not be surprising that there
is a new sheriff in town aiming to challenge the exercise of
federal executive power in the federal courts. Or, rather, there
are new sheriffs. In recent years, state attorneys general have
become increasingly more aggressive in seeking to patrol federal
executive action. During the Obama Administration, for example,
some state attorneys general instituted a series of cases, brought
on behalf of their home states, challenging federal action in the
areas of immigration9 and environmental protection.10 Since
President Trump took office, other state attorneys general have
filed actions against specific directives of his administration,
most notably in the immigration area.11 All signs suggest that
6 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488, 2495–96 (2015) (ruling in favor of the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),
which would allow a tax credit for those enrolled in either a Federal Exchange or State
Exchange, despite the ACA’s seemingly clear language limiting the tax credit for those
enrolled in State Exchanges).
7 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (holding that the president has the sole power
to recognize other sovereigns); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct.
1225, 1233 (2015) (remanding a nondelegation challenge to Amtrak rulemaking).
8 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577; see also
Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1523 (2013)
(criticizing the Court’s willingness to resolve structural constitutional disputes); Rachel E.
Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002) (arguing the Court is
more willing to rule on structural matters).
9 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (twentythree Republican state attorneys general, three Republican governors whose attorneys
general were Democrat, and one Republican governor filed suit against the United States
to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (“DAPA”) initiative). But see Brief of the Amicus States of Wash., Cal., Conn.,
Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., and Vt., and D.C., in Support of
Motion to Stay District Court Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Texas v. United States, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1285125, at *2–3 (fourteen Democratic
attorneys general for fourteen states and the District of Columbia filed briefs in support of
the United States’ amnesty policy).
10 See Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2014)
(No. 14-1146) , 2014 WL 6687575, at *6 (twelve Republican attorneys general filed briefs
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in response to increased regulation
of coal power plants). But see Final Brief for State Intervenors in Support of Respondent
at 10, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 14-1146), 2015 WL 926748, at
*6–7 (eleven Democratic attorneys general and the District of Columbia filed in support of
the EPA’s increased regulation measures).
11 All briefs filed by state attorneys general—both in opposition and in support of the
travel ban executive order—were done so strictly along party lines. See, e.g., Motion for
Leave to File and Brief for N.Y. et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petitioners’ Stay
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this trend of state attorneys general challenging exercises of
presidential power will continue.12
These state attorneys’ general suits face a critical threshold
barrier: standing to challenge federal executive power. Do the
states have such standing and, if so, under what circumstances
may they do so? This issue was central in Texas v. United States,
a case in which the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had
standing.13 The question was ultimately left unresolved by the
United States Supreme Court when the Fifth Circuit decision
was affirmed by an equally divided Court.14
This essay examines the issue of state standing to constrain
presidential power. Part I reviews why presidential power has so
drastically expanded since the Founding. It further discusses
why Congress has not been up to the task of checking the
president and why expanded state standing might be a useful
vehicle to constrain executive power. Part II canvasses the
existing case law regarding state standing to challenge federal
executive action and specifically includes recent cases brought
against the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part III
demonstrates how courts have found states to have standing to
challenge federal executive action, but also discusses how the
scope of that right is not yet clear. Part III(A) discusses why
states might be appropriate parties to bring actions challenging
federal executive power, including their role in diffusing power
Application at 3, Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 42 (2017) (No. 16-1540), 2017 WL 3049332,
at *5 (New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
D.C. filed as amicus curiae in support of Hawaii’s action); see also Profiles in Courage,
DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://democraticags.org/profiles-2/
[http://perma.cc/MUC2-65YC] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney
general in the aforementioned brief who opposed both the current administration’s travel
ban and climate change deregulation are Democrat); Motion for Leave to File and Brief
for Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and their Stay Application at 1,
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2533119, at *4
(Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia,
and the Governor of the State of Mississippi filed as amicus curiae in defense of the
administration’s executive order); see also Meet the Attorneys General, REPUBLICAN
A TTORNEYS G ENERAL A SSOCIATION, http://www.republicanags.com/meet_the_ags
[http://perma.cc/69TD-XXFN] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney
general in the aforementioned brief who supported the travel ban executive order
are Republican).
12 See Juliet Eilperin, NYU Law Launches New Center to Help State AGs Fight
Environmental Rollbacks, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/nyu-law-launches-new-center-to-help-state-ags-fight-environmental-rollbacks/
2017/08/16/e4df8494-82ac-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.a7c7b3e8b7b9
&yoyolxmi [http://perma.cc/UY2P-MQAT] (reporting that Bloomberg Philanthropies
funded a center to help state attorneys general bring environmental actions against the
United States).
13 Texas, 809 F.3d at 155–56.
14 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
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within the federal system. Part III(B) offers some reservations,
such as the fact that the states’ motivations in maintaining these
suits may be based more on partisan interests than on structural
concerns with constraining the federal executive. Part IV
proposes that states should enjoy a modicum of liberalized
standing by allowing a more generous construction of injury-infact as applied to them than would be applied to other entities. It
suggests, however, that even this modest grant of standing
should be subject to further prudential review in light of the
potential problems that state standing engenders. Part V offers a
brief conclusion.
I. THE EXPANDING POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY
As numerous participants in the Symposium have noted,
presidential power has expanded exponentially since the
Founding.15 There are many reasons for this expansion.16 Some
are simply the unavoidable effects of forces inherent in modern
government dynamics. For example, as Justice Jackson observed
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fact that the
office of the president has a unique hold on public and media
attention means that in “drama, magnitude and finality” its
decisions far overshadow those of any other.17 In addition, the
need for modern government to respond quickly to national crises
necessarily invests power in the presidency because only that
institution has the ability to act expeditiously.18 The growth of
the administrative state19 and the power of the armed forces has
inevitably empowered the president, who stands at the head of

15 See Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam
Legislation, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 41–42 (2018) (discussing a shift and rebalancing of power
from the legislative to the executive branch); Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator
Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 115–19 (2018) (demonstrating how executive branch’s power
has expanded through subdelegation of legislative authority); Sanford Levinson &
Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 168 (2018) (noting
the large power of the “[c]ontemporary” president); see also Tom Campbell, Executive
Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2017) (noting expansions of
executive power).
16 See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–19 (2008); see also Flaherty, supra
note 2, at 1816–19; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President [instead of
Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”).
17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
18 See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1806.
19 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 (1984) (describing the degree to
which administrative agencies are centrally managed by the president).
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both the Executive Branch and the military.20 The president has
unique access to and control over information in a world where
information is power.21
Other factors have contributed to this expansion. Presidents,
for example, are able to build upon the collective actions of their
predecessors in justifying their own actions—creating a one-way
ratchet that consistently expands presidential power from
administration to administration.22 The legal limits on
presidential power are defined in the first instance by the
president’s own appointees in the Justice Department23 who,
even if committed to providing objective legal advice, are often
predisposed to finding ways in which the president can further
his agenda.24 Finally, presidents are interested in building
legacies and they well understand that history judges leaders by
their actions and not by their forbearance. They are therefore
constantly exploring new avenues and methods to get things
done.25 After all, the last president celebrated for not exercising
power may very well be George Washington and his decision not
to run for a third term.26
Another key reason why presidential power has so
drastically expanded rests not with the presidency but with

20 See also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L.
REV. 335, 338 (2005) (discussing presidential control of the military).
21 See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).
22 See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458–60 (1997); see also John Yoo,
Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 429–30 (2008).
23 See LUTHER A. HUSTON, ARTHUR S. MILLER, SAMUEL KRISLOV & ROBERT D. DIXON,
JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968).
24 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 103, 107 (2001) for a discussion about how the ability (and
motivation) of the attorney general to challenge a president is likely to be particularly
diminished in times of crisis. The most famous documented example of this involves
Attorney General Francis Biddle and the evacuation of Japanese Americans during World
War II. Although Biddle had considerable doubts as to the constitutionality of the
evacuation order, he ended up dropping his opposition in the face of military objections
and a president who had, nonetheless, decided to go through with the action. See id.
25 President Bush, for example, was particularly aggressive in claiming that he had
inherent powers that justified his taking unilateral actions on key matters. See Bush Says
He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN (Dec. 17, 2005, 8:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa [http://perma.cc/9Y44-LF7H]. President Obama, in turn,
relied on his expansive reading of statutes to support his unilateral decisions. See Charlie
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obamabypass-congress.html?mcubz=3.
26 See Rufus King, Personal Memorandum (May 3, 1797), in 3 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING: COMPROMISING HIS LETTERS, PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL,
HIS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND HIS SPEECHES 545, 545 (Charles R. King ed., 1896).
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Congress.27 An effective system of separation of powers requires
Congress to protect its institutional prerogatives to check the
Executive. Yet the relationship between Congress and the
president has become instead, in the words of Darryl Levinson
and Richard Pildes, separation of parties.28 Members of Congress
see their primary role as advancing the interests of their party
and not protecting Congress’s institutional prerogatives.29
This dynamic has reduced the power of Congress and
increased the power of the president. When the same party holds
Congress and the presidency, congressional majorities often
stand behind their president even when doing so might diminish
their own institution’s authority, a practice that directly serves to
expand presidential power. Less obviously, even when there has
been a divided government, the dynamic of hyper-partisanship
has indirectly led to increased presidential power. In times of
divided government, of course, Congress is motivated to attempt
to check the president because it is in its partisan interests to
do.30 Yet presidents have become adept at characterizing this
resistance as Congress not doing its job to justify exercising
executive power unilaterally. They have thus been able to turn
congressional efforts to block their agenda into a mechanism for
enhancing their own powers.31 Congress, meanwhile, has had no
effective response.
In contrast to Congress, one institution that has been able to
block the president thus far is the Supreme Court. In cases such
as Youngstown,32 United States v. Nixon,33 and the war-on-terror
decisions,34 the Court has imposed important limits on the
Executive. Equally important, even in cases in which the

27 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of
Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013).
28 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329–30 (2006).
29 See Jeff Flake, My Party is in Denial About Donald Trump, POLITICO MAG. (July
31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/31/my-party-is-in-denial-aboutdonald-trump-215442 [http://perma.cc/UX7H-RPBY] (condemning both parties for blindly
engaging in partisan behavior).
30 See Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2267–68 (2013)
(describing an instance where Republican senators blocked a veteran jobs bill to prevent
President Obama from signing beneficial legislation before the 2012 election).
31 See William P. Marshall, Warning: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 Yale Online
L.J. F. 95 (2014); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV
773, 786 (2014).
32 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
34 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 646 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794 (2008).
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president has prevailed, the Court has indicated it is fully willing
to subject exercises of presidential power to judicial review.
Courts can hear cases only when parties have requisite
standing. This means that presidential actions may be able to
escape judicial review because of standing limitations. For
example, if the lower courts had not granted standing to Texas to
challenge President Obama’s Dreamers initiative, which declared
a policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large class of
immigrants, then it is likely no party would have been able to
maintain that suit.35 To establish standing to challenge a policy,
an individual must show he suffered an injury in fact because of
that policy.36 The Dreamers policy of not enforcing the law does
not obviously injure anyone; instead, it confers a benefit on the
immigrants covered by it. Giving the states standing to sue,
therefore, may be the only way through which a president’s
actions can be subject to judicial scrutiny. The next sections
accordingly examine the current law governing state standing
and discuss whether the scope of state standing should be
adjusted so as to provide an additional check on the expansion of
presidential power.
II. STATE STANDING TO SUE THE EXECUTIVE UNDER CURRENT
LAW
A.

The Law of State Standing
State suits against the president and other federal executive
officials seeking to force compliance with the Constitution and
federal law invariably raise questions of Article III standing.37
Standing is one of the various doctrines that implement the
“cases” and “controversies” provision in Article III.38
Ordinarily, to have standing, a person must demonstrate
that he has suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an
“injury in fact.”39 That injury must be to a “legally protected
35 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 786 (2013).
36 See WRIGHT, ET AL., infra note 49 and accompanying text.
37 Although the most heavily litigated, standing is not the only obstacle states face in
suits against federal actors. For example, states must also demonstrate their claim is ripe
and not moot. Although the United States and its officials also enjoy sovereign immunity
in suits by states, Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273,
280 (1983), section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act waives that immunity for
suits seeking non-monetary damages against an “officer or employee” of the United
States. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Accordingly, so long as a suit does not seek damages, sovereign
immunity should not be an obstacle to state suits against federal officials.
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
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interest”—for example, the interest against unwanted physical
harm—and it must be “concrete and particularized.”40 The injury
must also be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant,
and it must be susceptible to “redress[] by a favorable decision.”41
Individuals who fail to satisfy these requirements cannot
maintain suit in federal court.42
But for states, things are different. States can establish
standing by demonstrating an injury to the same sort of interests
held by private individuals such as the interest in holding
property. But because they are sovereigns, states also have
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, and the violation of
those interests can also support standing.43 Thus, states have
broader potential standing than private individuals.44
A state’s sovereign interests include its interests in enforcing
its criminal and civil laws. States can sue to enforce these
sovereign interests even when they do not suffer an injury in
fact.45 A state has standing, for example, to prosecute Dan for
assaulting Vicky in violation of state law, even though the
assault does not hurt the state.46 For similar reasons, states have
sovereign standing to defend their laws against challenges that
the laws are unconstitutional or preempted,47 and they have
standing to challenge federal laws pressuring the states to
change their laws.48
A state’s quasi-sovereign interests are less well defined.49
They include the state’s interest “in the well-being of its
populace,”50 such as by protecting its residents from pollution,51
reducing unemployment in the state,52 preserving wildlife in the
state,53 and ensuring that the state is “not . . . discriminatorily
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992).
42 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998).
43 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
44 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2004).
45 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (finding state standing based on the
“interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”).
46 See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392
(1995) (finding there is no standing problem when a state “prosecutes criminal and civil
actions under its own laws in its own courts”).
47 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137.
48 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (finding state standing to challenge
federal regulation requiring states to adopt new standards or to accept federal standards).
49 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.11 (2d ed. 1984) (describing quasi-sovereign interests as “admittedly vague”).
50 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
51 Id. at 604–05.
52 Id. at 608 (finding parens patriae standing to reduce unemployment).
53 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (noting “the quasi sovereign
right of the State to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”).
40
41
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denied its rightful status within the federal system.”54 States
have parens patriae standing—so-called because a state
asserting these interests is seeking to protect its residents and
resources—to vindicate these quasi-sovereign interests.
B.

State Suits against the Federal Executive
States’ standing in suits against the federal government,
however, is more complex. Although states have standing to
vindicate sovereign interests and parens patriae standing to
vindicate quasi-sovereign interests in other contexts, neither
form of standing provides a sound basis under current doctrine to
sue federal officials to force compliance with a federal statute or
the Constitution. States do not have a sovereign interest in
federal compliance with a federal statute or the Constitution.55
Federal law and the Constitution are not state law. Although
states must enforce federal and constitutional law, it is because
those laws trump state laws. The violation of federal law
accordingly does not inflict injury on a state’s sovereignty. It is
only if that violation also happens to violate, or interfere with,
state law that a state suffers a sovereign injury supporting
sovereign standing.56
States also likely do not have parens patriae standing to sue
the president to force him to comply with federal law or
the Constitution. This is not because states do not have a
quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring that their residents are
governed by a law abiding federal government. They do. The
failure of the federal government to obey federal law can
threaten a state’s property, resources, stability, and population.
Rather, the problem is that, according to the Supreme Court,
states cannot assert those interests of its citizens against the
United States.57
The reason is that the point of a parens patriae suit is to
allow a sovereign to protect its citizens, and the citizens of a state
are also citizens of the United States.58 According to the Court,
the United States has the primary responsibility of managing the
federal government and ensuring its compliance with federal

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607.
Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 886–87 (2016).
56 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–25 (1966) (upholding state’s
standing to enforce state law against Attorney General).
57 Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] State may not use
[parens patriae] to sue the United States.”).
58 Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
54
55
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law.59 Therefore, states cannot sue the federal government as
parens patriae to protect state citizens from unconstitutional acts
of the federal government.60 For example, in Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens patriae
standing to challenge, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal
law giving money to states that took certain measures to protect
mothers and infants.61
Under this logic, states likely do not have parens patriae
standing to sue the president or other federal officers to force
compliance with the Constitution or federal law. Such a suit
seeks to protect state citizens from federal actions that violate
federal law or the Constitution. To be sure, the suit targets
executive actions instead of legislative ones, as in Mellon, but it
is unclear why that distinction should matter. What matters is
whether the suit challenges the acts of the federal government.
One might argue the difference is that the suit is against an
officer and not the United States. That difference, however,
should not matter as to a state’s parens patriae standing. The
United States acts through its officers to protect its citizens as
parens patriae. That is especially true for the president. Article II
explicitly tasks him with seeing that federal law is enforced.62
Given the difficulties with states establishing sovereign or
quasi-sovereign standing against the president, it is no surprise
that courts that have recently found that state standing to
challenge presidential actions have avoided the sovereignty and
quasi-sovereignty question, and have instead based standing on
factual injuries alleged by the states.63 Consider Texas v. United
States.64 There, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a
policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large swath of

59 Id. (“[I]n respect of their relations with the [f]ederal [g]overnment[, it is] . . . the
United States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae, when such
representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must
look for such protective measures as flow from that status.”).
60 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“Nor does a State have standing as the parent of its
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government.”);
accord Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, at
§ 3531.11.1 (“[I]t is settled that a state cannot appear as parens patriae to assert
the rights of its citizens to be protected against unconstitutional acts of the
federal government.”).
61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486.
62 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
63 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015) (basing
standing on increased costs from issuing licenses), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2016); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying
Lujan factors in analyzing state standing based on alleged harm to proprietary interests).
64 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 155–56 (basing standing on increased costs
from issuing licenses).
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individuals illegally in the United States,65 deeming these
individuals to be “lawfully present in the United States.”66 Texas
and twenty-six other states challenged the policy, claiming that
the Department’s policy violated the Administrative Procedure
Act. Texas argued it had parens patriae standing and that it had
suffered an injury in fact.
In finding Texas had standing, both the district court and
the Fifth Circuit avoided the question whether Texas had parens
patriae standing. Instead, they concluded that Texas had
suffered an adequate injury in fact. The courts pointed out that,
because Texas law authorizes lawfully present individuals to
obtain a Texas drivers license, Homeland Security’s policy
expanded the number of individuals eligible for Texas licenses,
and Texas would incur costs in issuing these licenses. According
to the courts, these costs supported Texas’s standing, even
though Texas could have eliminated those costs by amending
Texas law to bar those immigrants from obtaining licenses.67
The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Washington v.
Trump.68 There, Washington and Minnesota filed suit
challenging President Trump’s Executive Order suspending
entry of immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen. The states argued the policy violated the
Establishment Clause, Due Process under the Fifth Amendment,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Tenth Amendment.69
Washington and Minnesota asserted standing based on both a
violation of their quasi-sovereign interests and an injury in fact
to their proprietary interests.
Like the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States, the Ninth
Circuit avoided the question whether the states had standing
based on their quasi-sovereign interests.70 Instead, the Circuit
65 Id. at 147 (“In November 2014, by what is termed the ‘DAPA Memo,’ DHS
expanded DACA by making millions more persons eligible for the program and extending
‘[t]he period for which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is
granted . . . to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments.”)
(citing Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir. USCIS, et al. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2NJ-2J26]).
66 Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).
67 See id. at 155–56 (holding the “financial loss[es]” that Texas would bear, due to
having to grant drivers licenses, constituted a concrete and immediate injury for
standing purposes).
68 See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1157–61.
69 Id. at 1157.
70 See id. at 1161 n.5; see also id. at 1157 (concluding the States had Article III
standing based on both proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests).
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concluded the states had suffered an injury in fact. The court
stated the executive order caused a concrete and particularized
injury to the states’ public universities by preventing nationals of
the designated countries from entering the country to join the
universities as faculty and students.71
III. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF STATES IN SUING THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE
A.

The Role of the States
States have a special role in ensuring the federal executive’s
compliance with the Constitution because of their interest in
preserving federalism. Federalism defines the boundary between
the states and the federal government.72 The federal government
is one of limited powers.73 For example, the Constitution
empowers Congress to legislate in only a few designated areas.74
States do not face comparable limitations. States have general
government powers. They may broadly regulate in any area,
including areas in which the federal government may also
regulate,75 and they may broadly enforce those laws.
States have an interest in protecting their domain from
federal intrusion. That interest is most obvious when the federal
executive takes actions that directly interfere with matters
committed to the states.76 An example is the promulgation of
a rule by an executive agency that regulates completely
local matters.77
But the states’ federalism interest in ensuring that the
Executive complies with the constitution is not limited to the
executive actions that directly invade the province of the states.
States have a federalism interest in preventing all unlawful
executive actions, even if those actions do not directly touch on
an area reserved to the states.78 That is so for two reasons.
First, states have a political interest in ensuring that the
president not exercise powers allocated to Congress because of
Id. at 1161.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
73 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
75 But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (the prohibition on states “coin[ing] [m]oney” is an
example of how the Constitution imposes several discrete limits on state power).
76 See Grove, supra note 55, at 887.
77 See id.
78 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 462 (2012) (observing that “cooperative federalism
schemes provide a check on federal executive power” and that “[t]he very growth of
the federal administrative state has swept states up as necessary administrators of
federal law”).
71
72
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their better representation in Congress.79 Although the president
is elected through a nationwide election, he does not represent a
particular state; he represents the nation collectively. By
contrast, each state has representatives in Congress who
can defend their state’s interests. Pushing actions from the
Executive to Congress thus gives states a larger say in federal
policy decisions.80
Second, states have a direct regulatory interest in preventing
unlawful executive action because a declaration that a federal
executive action is unlawful prevents that action from
preempting state law or from otherwise affecting how states
conduct themselves. Consider an executive order that regulates
interstate commerce. That order does not impermissibly touch an
area left to the states because the Constitution authorizes the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce.81 Instead,
the constitutional objection is that the order violates separation
of powers because the Constitution commits to Congress, not the
president, the power to regulate that commerce. But states have
a federalism interest in challenging that executive order, because
that executive order would preempt inconsistent state laws on
commerce. Voiding the executive order removes the possibility for
preemption and accordingly leaves the states in a better position
to issue regulations on commerce.
The same argument applies to executive actions that fail to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and other
requirements imposed by statute. Those actions can preempt
state law. Even when they do not preempt, those agency actions
can influence the way states act—by, for example, administering
spending programs that condition the disbursement of funds on
the state’s meeting requirements imposed by the agency.82
Because they interfere with state autonomy, states have a

79 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age
of Polarization, at 19 (manuscript on file with authors) (“[I]t’s terribly important for
federalism that Congress make the laws, not executive actors.”).
80 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 547 (1954). To be sure, especially in recent times, Congress has not been particularly
effective at policymaking because of gridlock. But that gridlock may be a function, at least
in part, of the divergent views of states.
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 H ARV. E NVTL. L. R EV. 67, 82 (2007)
(acknowledging, in the context of environment agency action, that “federal agency actions
can . . . have preclusive effect” and that “[t]he most straightforward way to encourage
state activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet federal
requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant state governments”).
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federalism interest in challenging executive actions that violate
the APA or other statutory procedures.83
This state interest in limiting the federal government to
protect the states’ prerogatives is a critical part of the
constitutional design. The principal reason for dividing power
between state and federal government is to check abuses of
federal power and to prevent the establishment of a federal
tyranny.84 The idea is not simply that sharing power with the
states results in the federal government not having the complete
authority necessary to establish a tyranny. It is also that state
officials seeking to protect their own power “stand ready to check
the usurpations”85 of the federal government. As Madison put it
in Federalist No. 51, the competition for power between the state
and federal government ensures that the “different governments
will control each other[.]”86 The Constitution’s design thus
contemplates that the states stand as guardians against federal
overreach.87 All of these interests support enabling states to
bring suits challenging unlawful executive actions.
In addition to having these federalism interests, states are
particularly well suited to bring challenge to executive actions
because of their democratic accountability. One reason for the
standing doctrine is to prevent would-be litigants from
undermining the political process by limiting their access to the
courts. The premise of our Constitution is that the elected
branches make policy, and elections are the appropriate
mechanism to seek to change government policies. Permitting
individuals to resort to the court to challenge government policies
short-circuits this political process. Standing seeks to avoid
this problem by permitting individuals to go to court only if
they have suffered direct injuries from the government’s
83 This logic extends to federal executive actions that violate individual
constitutional rights. A successful challenge to a federal action on the ground that it
violates a constitutional right promotes federalism by barring federal action that
preempts state law. To be sure, preventing the federal government from taking actions
that violate rights would not let states take the same actions, because with only a few
exceptions constitutional rights equally bar the federal government and the states. Still,
removing the federal program would leave space for a state to regulate in that area.
84 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”).
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87 A broad argument for state standing could be based on the premise that the
Constitution should be viewed as a compact among the states. See John C. Calhoun,
Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION AND LIBERTY:
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 350 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992)
(advocating the state-compact theory of the Constitution). If so, states could arguably
have standing to challenge all ultra vires federal actions as a breach of contract. Because
the premise of this argument is so contestable and its potential implications so
far-reaching, however, we do not advance that argument here.
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actions. Individuals cannot, in other words, base standing on
generalized grievances.
Broad state standing does not threaten the political
processes to the same degree because states themselves are
political entities. They are unlikely to bring suits that are
inconsistent with the majority views of their constituency.
Consistent with this view, states do not face the same standing
restriction for generalized grievances. For example, unlike
individuals, states can bring suit to enforce state criminal laws,
even when the violation of the criminal law does not directly
harm the state.88
There are also pragmatic reasons why states should enjoy
broader standing than individuals. Unlike many individuals who
might bring suit against the federal executive, states are prone to
take a more deliberative and cautious approach to assessing
when to bring suit. They are more likely to evaluate the merits
more carefully to avoid spending their taxpayers’ money on a suit
that they cannot win. Moreover, unlike many individuals, states
have the resources to launch and maintain a significant judicial
challenge to executive actions.89 As with any major litigation,
pursuing a challenge to an executive action can be an expensive
affair because of the scope of discovery, the breadth of the issues,
and the intense motions practice. In addition, more than other
types of suits, challenges to an executive action turn on
sophisticated legal arguments that can be made most effectively
by attorneys that specialize in the relevant field of law. Most
private individuals lack the resources to maintain this type of
litigation and to retain specialist attorneys who are more likely
to prevail on a such a challenge.
To be sure, states are not the only ones with the interests
and resources to challenge the federal executive. Congress also
plays a significant role in constraining the federal executive. Just
as with federalism, the reason that the Constitution divides
power between Congress and the president is to prevent either
branch from accumulating or abusing its power.90 Conferring
broader legislative standing on Congress to challenge federal
executive actions would increase Congress’s ability to play
that role.91
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 46, at 392.
See Raymond H. Brecia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
90 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[T]he separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch[.]”).
91 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 15, at 603, 605 (arguing Congress should have
broader standing to challenge executive decisions not to enforce the law).
88
89
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Whether Congress should have greater standing to challenge
the president is beyond the scope of this Article; but there are
sound reasons to be cautious before proceeding too far down this
route. The most significant is that broader congressional
standing could threaten the balance of powers.92 Although
Congress has largely abdicated its function of checking the
president, Congress has the potential to be extremely powerful,
not only because it holds the legislative and other powers, but
also because it has more direct popular support than the other
branches of government.93 For this reason, the Constitution
imposes various limits on Congress’s power. One limitation is
that the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s power.
Another limitation is that the Constitution prescribes procedures
that Congress must follow to exercise those powers. For example,
for Congress to create a law, the bill must pass both houses of
Congress and be presented to the president for his approval
before becoming a law.94 Similarly, Article I prescribes a specific
procedure that Congress must follow to remove a federal officer
through impeachment.95
Among the various powers given to Congress are a handful of
tools with which Congress can respond to illegal executive action.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact new legislation,
bring impeachment proceedings, withhold appropriations, or
refuse to confirm nominations. Conferring standing on Congress
to challenge executive actions would add a new weapon to
Congress’s arsenal for challenging executive action. If Congress
one day decided to begin using all of its tools for checking
92 The text of the Constitution does not explicitly answer whether Congress can
bring lawsuits. On one hand, the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s powers,
such as the power to enact legislation, impeach federal officials, and approve treaties and
nominations for various federal offices. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8, 10. One might argue
that the enumeration of these powers implies that Congress cannot exercise powers not
specifically enumerated, and bringing suit is not one of the powers enumerated in the
Constitution. On the other hand, one might argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to enact legislation conferring standing on itself to challenge
unlawful federal action. But cf. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited)
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014) (“Congress may
not delegate to itself the power to execute the laws.”) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
956 (1983)); see also id. at 577 (finding that “[t]he defense of federal statutes by
[Congress]” offends the principle that “the Constitution carefully separates the enactment
of federal law from its implementation, sharply constraining Congress’s role in and
control over the latter”).
93 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [The legislature’s] constitutional powers
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the
greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”).
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
95 Id. § 3, cl. 6–7.
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executive power, the additional tool of broad standing could
disrupt the balance of power.96
B.

Concerns with State Standing
Although there are obvious benefits in granting states
standing to bring suits to challenge separation of powers, there
are some serious concerns. To begin with, even if states are well
situated as an abstract matter to challenge exercises of federal
executive power, states, in the abstract, do not file lawsuits. A
state officer or entity (usually the state attorney general) must
bring such claims in the name of the states. And therein lies the
rub. Any ideal of the states acting as platonic guardians standing
against federal executive excesses needs to be tempered by
political reality.
There are often raw political reasons why state attorneys
general pursue actions against the federal government beyond
their having serious concerns about the scope of federal executive
power.97 Challenging a president of the other party leads to its
own series of rewards.98 State attorneys general can earn favor
with their constituencies, position themselves for running for
higher office, and enhance their leadership standing within their
political party.99 They can raise money for their offices and their
states in the form of damages and attorneys’ fees, and they can
raise money for their own political campaigns in the form of
campaign contributions from supporters pleased by their
actions.100 They can stop, delay, harass, or hinder the
implementation of federal policies that they ideologically oppose.
It is therefore not surprising that one must look hard and
long to find a lawsuit brought by the states challenging the
federal government that is motivated by deep-founded concerns
for separation of powers rather than by partisan preference. It
is, after all, no accident that Republican attorneys general
led the actions against the Obama Administration and that
96 Moreover, while the checks provided by the Constitution can be politically costly
for Congress to use, the filing of a lawsuit is relatively low cost. Expanding congressional
standing could very well result in members of Congress using only lawsuits, and not the
constitutionally prescribed procedures, to challenge executive actions.
97 To be sure, not all suits by state attorneys general have partisan motivations. See
Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 25–26 (arguing that business interests and other
considerations drive some state attorney general litigation decisions).
98 See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing there are both personal and departmental
incentives for state attorneys general to score significant legal victories, including
political and reputational benefits, pleasing state constituencies for reelection purposes,
and obtaining financial awards that can often be retained by enforcement agencies).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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Democratic attorneys general prosecuted lawsuits against
President Trump.101
It was not always this way. For many years, state attorneys
general worked across party lines to protect state interests;102
including, on occasion, taking actions contrary to their own
partisan interests.103 No longer. Bipartisanship has become the
rare exception104 and institutional concerns have become
subservient to partisan agendas.105 The same polarization forces
that once undermined Congress’s ability to check the president
now affect state attorneys general.106
This is not to say a suit filed for partisan reasons is somehow
illegitimate or cannot have a substantial effect in checking
against separation of powers abuses.107 It does suggest, however,
the states may not have such a uniquely pristine role in
patrolling federal executive action that they can be distinguished
from other interested parties for the purpose of standing. It also
suggests that even if states are granted standing, the credibility
and gravitas of their claims may be diminished,108 thus
undercutting one of the central reasons for granting states
expansive standing in the first place.109
Expanded state standing may also bring to the forefront
another difficult issue—determining who, for the purposes of
such litigation, is the appropriate officer or entity to represent
the state. Is it the state attorney general, the governor, the
101 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (showing that Republican attorneys
general and Republican states take action against Democratic presidents, while
Democratic attorneys general and Democratic states take action against Republican
presidents); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests:
Attorneys General As Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2015) (showing an overall
increase in partisan amicus briefs filed by state attorneys general beginning in
the 2000s).
102 Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 20).
103 Lemos & Quinn, supra note 101, at 1256.
104 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015); see Johnstone, supra note
102, at 23 (suggesting the turning point of this may have been when then-Alabama
Attorney General (now Judge William Pryor) created the Republican Attorneys General
Association).
105 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090–92
(2014) (noting that state objections to federal power are primarily based on partisan
politics and not the protection of state prerogatives).
106 Id.
107 See Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing that state litigation with
partisan motivation still plays the useful role of checking federal power); Grove, supra
note 55, at 897 (rejecting the notion that states should have expansive standing to sue the
federal government but also noting that partisan motivations can lead “state officials to
do a better job of representing the State in court”).
108 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 22.
109 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.

Do Not Delete

2018]

3/21/18 4:27 PM

State Standing to Constrain the President

101

leaders of the legislature, or even citizens who sponsor state
initiatives? Should state attorneys general have the authority to
bring such lawsuits on behalf of the state when the legislature or
the governor opposes such actions? Should the attorneys general
be required to bring such a claim if the governor or legislature
presses her to do so, even if she opposes such action? And how, if
at all, should a federal court hearing such a claim resolve this
internal issue? Put simply, there is a Pandora’s Box of state law
issues underlying these lawsuits,110 and federal courts will have
to insert themselves in the thicket of intra-state divisions of
power to be able to hear these cases. It is a project, we suspect,
federal courts might want to avoid.111
Finally, expanded state standing to challenge federal
executive action also means an expanded role for the courts. As
discussed above, there are strong positive reasons why courts
should be more involved in imposing constraints upon executive
branch action, but also reasons to be cautious. After all, the
theories that posit that disputes over federalism and separation
of powers should be resolved by the political processes rather
than the courts112 presented more than just an abstract
110 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2455–67
(2006) (discussing cases addressing which state officer represents the state); Joseph
Kanefield & Blake W. Rebling, Who Speaks for Arizona: The Respective Roles of the
Governor and Attorney General When the State is Named in a Lawsuit, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
689 (2011) (discussing the various issues surrounding which state official should
represent a state and concluding that, for the purpose of unity and clarity, the state
attorney general should be subservient to the governor in any case involving the state);
but see State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 642–45 (W. Va.
2013) (ruling that state attorney generals have common law powers that are not specified
by statute, despite the fact other courts and legal scholars disagree on this point); see also
Press Release, Georgia: Governor Lifts Block Against Syrian Refugees (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/georgia-governor-lifs-block-against-syrianrefugees.html (describing when Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal rescinded an executive
order to block the placement of Syrian refugees within his state, after his attorney general
officially announced that Governor Deal did not have the authority to issue such an order
in the first place); Press Release, Office of Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Terry
Goddard Declines to Join Lawsuits Against Federal Health Care Law (Mar. 24, 2010),
https://groupwise.azag.gov/press-release/terry-goddard-declines-join-lawsuits-againstfederal-health-care-law [http://perma.cc/39PX-8U4J] (describing Democrat Attorney
General Goddard’s refusal to join the Republican-led health care suit for its lack of merit);
State ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 3:10–cv–91–
RV/EMT, 2010 WL 2000518 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2010) (in which Republican Governor Jan
Brewer represented Arizona in a suit when Arizona’s attorney general publicly refused
to join).
111 Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (holding the
federal court should abstain in answering the question of whether a city had the power to
initiate eminent domain proceedings under state law).
112 See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
263 (1980) (arguing the judiciary should not rule on constitutional questions regarding
the allocation of powers between Congress and the president); Herbert Wechlsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing the Supreme Court
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affirmation of the role of politics as a constitutional constraint on
the exercise of federal power. They also offered the tangible
advantage of extricating the judiciary from particularly difficult
and often highly politicized determinations. Setting a standard
for when separation of powers is violated consistently presents
the judiciary with concerns of judicial management, as well as
with questions of judicial enforceability and the challenge of
maintaining political capital when issuing politically charged
decisions. Accordingly, fashioning doctrines that could keep the
courts out of federalism and inter-branch disputes was attractive
on a number of counts. As Alexander Bickel taught long ago,
there are significant benefits that may be gained from a
modest judiciary.113
The value of avoiding the courts as the arbiters of politicallyladen issues surrounding the scope of presidential power may
have even greater resonance in the current climate in which the
dynamics of polarization and judicial selection have infected the
courts as well as the other branches.114 First, if the courts’
decisions regarding the exercise of presidential power are
motivated by partisan concerns, they will hardly do much to
constrain the Executive, particularly when the president is of the
same party. Second, to the extent that court decisions seem to
reflect partisan preferences, they will undercut the courts’
legitimacy.115 Third, even if the judicial system as a whole is able
to insulate itself against partisan decision-making, particular
judges may not be so self-constrained. Already, the experience
with states bringing actions challenging federal action has
reflected a substantial amount of judge shopping, and there is no
reason to assume that savvy attorneys general will cease using
this tactic in later cases. But the potential costs to the national
interest of a partisan decision by an errant judge could be
considerable. A single judge, after all, can do significant mischief
in interrupting presidential actions—even if that action later
turns out to be perfectly legal.

must exercise restraint and neutrality, and that there must be limits on its ability to bind
other branches and the states in its constitutional interpretation).
113 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (advocating that the Supreme Court use discretion
to avoid deciding controversial issues); see also Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1828
(advocating that courts revisit and incorporate Bickel’s notions of “passive virtues”).
114 See Johnstone, supra note 102, at 3–4.
115 Id. at 5.
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IV. RELAXING INJURY IN FACT FOR STATES TO CHALLENGE
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
What should be clear by this point is that states are
particularly well positioned to constrain expanding executive
power. States have a unique federalism interest in ensuring that
federal executive officers comply with the Constitution and
federal laws, and they have the resources and sophistication to
bring successful suits of this sort. At the same time, however,
there are concerns with granting states plenary standing to bring
any suit against the Executive. One way to balance these benefits
and concerns about empowering states to challenge executive
actions is to relax the injury in fact test for states, but impose
prudential constraints on standing. Easing the injury in fact test
would expand the power of the state to bring suit. But it would
still require states to demonstrate some type of actual injury that
would ensure that states do not meddle in affairs that truly do
not affect them. Moreover, continuing to enforce prudential
limitations, such as third-party standing, would prevent states
from bringing suits that others are better positioned to litigate.
Finally, in order to further guard against hyper-partisanship, we
also propose requiring states to show some level of bipartisan
support to maintain their actions against the Executive.
The injury in fact test requires that a plaintiff show he has
suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an “injury in fact.”116
That injury must be to a “legally protected interest,” and it must
be “concrete and particularized.”117 Moreover, the injury must be
traceable to the defendant and of the sort that courts could likely
redress through a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.118 Ordinarily, a
plaintiff satisfies this test by showing a loss of money or physical
harm.119 However, this is not always the case. Although courts
purport to apply the same injury in fact test in all cases, in
practice, different tests apply to different types of cases.120
For example, courts have often relaxed the injury
requirement for Equal Protection Clause violations.121 Thus, in
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
118 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992).
119 But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (defining injury in fact to
include injuries to “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” and “economic well-being”).
120 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1065 (2015).
121 Id. at 1075 (“[T]he Supreme Court does not always demand a redressable ‘Wallet
Injury’ to ground standing . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618–19 (1988) (the Court notoriously relaxed standing for alleged
Establishment Clause violations); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2002) (“[T]he Court often waves litigants
complaining of government support for religious endeavor right past the injury hurdle.”).
116
117
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that a
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge a government
program that gave preference to minority businesses.122 In doing
so, the Court dispensed with the “concrete” requirement for
injury and the requirement of redressability because the plaintiff
could not prove that it would have received any contracts if race
were not considered.123 Instead, the Court explained the denial of
the opportunity “to compete on an equal footing” constituted a
sufficient injury for standing.124
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have been less
willing to find standing in cases in which the plaintiff challenges
government actions related to national security.125 In Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, for example, the Court explicitly
indicated the imminence requirement is particularly rigorous in
suits challenging actions implicating national security.126
Similarly, and more salient to this essay, federalism
concerns appear to have led to restrictions on standing. Consider
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.127 There, an individual who had
previously been choked by police sued the police, alleging he
might again be subject to a police chokehold.128 The Court denied
standing on the ground the injury was too speculative. Given
the Court’s willingness to find standing based on other
low-probability injuries, one explanation for the denial of
standing in Lyons is the Court sought to avoid interfering with
the inner workings of state’s government.129
These decisions show that the rigor of the injury in fact test
varies depending on certain considerations, such as separation of

But see id. at 311 (discussing how the Court has not always been so generous with Equal
Protection standing and listing cases as examples).
122 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–12 (1995).
123 See id. at 211.
124 Id. (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’”) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)). For
other examples of the same analysis, see Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667–68 (1993), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978).
125 F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV.
673, 725 (2017) (arguing the standing test is stricter for national security cases than
Equal Protection Clause cases).
126 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); see Fallon, supra note
120, at 1079 (expanding on this point).
127 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
128 Id. at 97–98.
129 F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 76 (2012) (“The
denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may reflect the Court's
unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state government.”).
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powers, federalism, and the type of right asserted.130 When a suit
raises a challenge in an area that federal courts generally seek to
avoid, such as national security or the military, the standing
inquiry is more stringent.131 By contrast, when a suit seeks to
vindicate rights that federal courts have regarded as particularly
important, the standing test is relaxed.132
In this light, the injury in fact test should be relaxed when a
state sues to force executive officers to comply with the law.133 As
discussed above, states have a unique interest in preventing
unlawful federal action. Permitting states to protect that interest
is a fundamental component of the division of power in the
Constitution. More pragmatically, state officials are prudent
enough to bring only those suits that matter, that they may win,
and that they have the resources to argue effectively. They
accordingly should face a lower standing threshold when
challenging unlawful executive action or inaction.
There are a variety of ways to operationalize a relaxed
standing requirement. One way is to expand the types of injuries
that suffice for state standing in such suits. For example, one
could expand state standing to injuries for which the states are
partly responsible. Courts have said individuals should not be
permitted to base standing on injuries that are based on
reactions to federal actions. Thus, in Clapper, the Court held that
the costs that private individuals incurred to avoid federal
surveillance was insufficient to confer standing on those
individuals to challenge the surveillance program.134 But one
could discard this restriction when states sue the Executive.
The Fifth Circuit arguably adopted this approach in Texas v.
United States.135 There, the Republican Attorney General of
Texas challenged President Obama’s policies deeming various
types of illegal immigrants to be lawfully present in the United
130 Id. at 77 (noting that separation of powers, federalism, and docket size affect
standing decisions).
131 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) (“In
fact the law of standing has become so disjointed that the danger now exists that the
Court will come to accept it as a manipulable doctrine whose primary value lies in its
ability to serve nonjurisdictional ends.”).
132 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 304 (2008) (“The Court has been hesitant to deny standing in cases involving
the violation of a right that the Court deems particularly important even when the
plaintiff has not suffered a perceptible injury.”).
133 See Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that even
though a state cannot sue the United States parens patriae, it should get “‘special
solicitude’ to sue the United States . . . if a quasi-sovereign interest of the state is
at stake”).
134 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 417 (2013).
135 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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States. To establish standing, Texas argued that under Texas
law, these immigrants could obtain driver’s licenses, and Texas
would incur costs in issuing these licenses. The Fifth Circuit held
these costs supported Texas’s standing, even though Texas could
have eliminated those costs by amending Texas law to bar those
immigrants from obtaining licenses.136
This is not to say states should always be able to create an
injury in fact. For example, Texas should not have had standing
if it enacted its law authorizing immigrants to obtain driver’s
licenses after President Obama adopted his policies. In that
situation, federal law would not have forced Texas to incur the
costs of providing licenses to immigrants because, at that time of
the adoption of the federal policy, Texas would not have been
required to provide licenses to immigrants. Rather, Texas would
have incurred the cost of providing licenses to immigrants
through its own action of enacting the Texas law against the
backdrop of the federal policy.
Nor is it fair to say that any federal action that conflicts with
state law creates an injury in fact sufficient for the state’s
standing.137 The state must point to some sort of factual effect on
the state to establish an injury in fact.
Another way to soften the injury in fact test for state claims
against the executive is to relax the requirement that the injury
not be speculative,138 requiring states to show only that there is a
realistic possibility that they might suffer the threatened harm
instead of a high probability. This approach finds support in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.139 There,
Massachusetts sued the EPA for failing to regulate carbon
dioxide. Massachusetts claimed it had standing because federal
law conferred a cause of action on the states to challenge the
EPA’s decision, and because the Environmental Protection
Agency’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide would result in global
warming, which in turn would raise sea levels and erode

See id. at 155–57.
See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011)
(concluding the preemption of Virginia law prohibiting individual mandates by the
individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not
cause Virginia an injury in fact). It may be possible that federal preemption of state law
creates standing based on the impairment of the state’s sovereign interest, as opposed to
being based on the state suffering an injury in fact. But we leave that issue for
another day.
138 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned speculation”);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (denying standing because the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated a “substantial probability” of harm).
139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
136
137
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Massachusetts’s
land.140
The
Court
concluded
these
considerations sufficed for standing, explaining when they have
“quasi-sovereign interests” at stake, states are entitled to “special
solicitude” in the standing analysis.141 The Court did not explain
what it meant by “special solicitude.” One might think from the
reference to “quasi-sovereign interests” that the special solicitude
referred to parens patriae standing. But that is not so. The Court
did not base standing on Massachusetts’s role as parens patriae.
Instead, the Court pointed to the factual injury of the erosion to
Massachusetts’s land.142
Rather than referring to parens patriae standing, it appears
that the special solicitude the Court afforded Massachusetts was
to relax the restriction on speculative injuries. The erosion to
Massachusetts’s land would not occur for decades.143 That distant
and speculative injury would likely not suffice for standing.144
The Court’s conclusion that the possible erosion did suffice
suggests that it applied the imminence requirement less
rigorously. Massachusetts v. EPA thus supports the idea that,
when a state alleges a quasi-sovereign interest, the standing
inquiry should be relaxed, even when the state seeks to
base standing on an injury in fact instead of parens
patriae standing.145
At the same time, we also suggest that even this relatively
modest proposal of relaxing the injury in fact requirement
for states should be further qualified. As pointed out
previously, expanded state standing creates its own set of
concerns—specifically that many of these actions will be
driven more by a motivation for political disruption than by a
true concern with executive branch overreach.146 Some, of course,
might suggest this is fine—that the use of highly partisan
attorneys general as a check against highly partisan presidents
is fully consonant with Madison’s notion of ambition
counteracting ambition.147 Perhaps. Yet the use of excessive
Id. at 518–22.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521–24.
143 Id. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the possible loss of land as one
harm supporting standing in the next few decades).
144 As the Court explained in Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992),
the further off in time that an injury may occur tends to make the injury more
speculative. See id. (stating the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the alleged
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly
impending’”) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
145 For other instances in which federal courts have relaxed standing requirements
for states, see Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 11–12.
146 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
140
141
142
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partisanship as a method to reduce the effects of excessive
partisanship does not seem to be the type of remedy that would
help combat the polarization that lies at the heart of much of the
dysfunction that has helped lead to the expansion of presidential
power in the first place. More directly, the potential risk to the
national interest engendered by overly partisan attorneys
general bringing harassment or dilatory actions against the
executive in front of overly partisan courts is not one that can be
easily glossed over.
For this reason, we propose the courts demand some indicia
of bipartisanship as a prudential matter before relaxing the
injury in fact requirement for states.148 To be clear, we are not
suggesting that courts should deny standing if the state meets
traditional injury in fact requirements.149 But in cases in which
the injury in fact requirement needs to be relaxed to find
standing, there should be a showing that the action has some
measure of bipartisan support to justify the “special solicitude”
the Supreme Court had indicated may be warranted when a
sovereign state is bringing the claim.150 Thus, under our
approach, both the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA151
and in United States v. Texas152 would have had to demonstrate
bipartisan support, since in both cases the injury in fact
requirement was relaxed.153 In Washington v. Trump,154 on the
other hand, no showing would have been needed because the
state readily satisfied injury in fact requirements.155
Anthony Johnstone and Michael Solimine, writing
separately, have advocated for a similar approach in the context
of amicus briefs, contending that the Supreme Court should only
give deference to briefs from the states that reflect some level of
bipartisan support.156 In fact, the National Association of
Attorneys General (“NAAG”) already requires bipartisan action
by attorneys general in order to invoke the authority of the
states. Its constitution requires that in order for a sign-on letter
148 This does not necessarily mean more than one state will always be necessary to
maintain an action. But if one state goes at it alone, it should be required to assert that
the action has some bipartisan support.
149 E.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d. 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017).
150 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803,
810 (7th Cir. 2015).
151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
152 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015).
153 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at
155–56.
154 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1158–61.
155 Id.
156 Johnstone, supra note 102, note at 29–30; Michael Solimine, Retooling the Amicus
Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 166 n.86 (2016).
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to become NAAG policy (appearing on NAAG letterhead as a
result), the letter must have at least the support of thirty-six
attorneys general (a two-thirds majority of NAAG’s overall state
and territorial membership).157
These approaches make sense. As Johnstone indicates, the
requirement of bipartisanship works to assure that the case is “a
reliable signal of general state interests.”158 Further, because
such a requirement would force attorneys general to work across
party lines, it may, in that respect, have the additional benefit of
helping work against the tide of partisan polarization.159
We also propose the courts should not allow states to
maintain third-party standing cases absent a showing of cross
party support. The Court has already held that whether a party
can sue on behalf of the rights of third parties is a matter for
prudential consideration.160 Taking steps to assure that a lawsuit
against the president brought by a state is more than only
a partisan attack would seem to be a prudent exercise of
judicial power.161
Finally, state standing should be allowed only upon a proper
showing that the state officer or entity bringing the suit is the
single correct party to maintain the action in the federal court.
As noted previously, various state officials—the governor,
attorney general, legislators, and even individuals who sponsor
state initiatives—often dispute who has the authority to litigate
on behalf of the state.162 Those disputes are exacerbated when
the officers disagree on the merits of the action. Both the state
attorney general who thinks the president has violated the
Constitution and the state governor who thinks that the
president’s action is lawful may each claim that he alone has the
power to bring suit on behalf of the state. To avoid the
embarrassment of resolving a suit against the president
improperly brought by the wrong state official, federal courts
should closely examine whether the official bringing the case has
the authority to do so under state law. If state law does not
authorize the officer who brought the suit to do so, or even if the
law is unclear, courts exercise their discretion to deny standing.
Dismissing on that ground would prevent unnecessary conflict

157 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL art. VIII, § 2.
158 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 29.
159 See id.; Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development
of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 393 (2012).
160 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
161 Cf. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004).
162 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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with the president and avoid deciding many unnecessary
constitutional questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The vast expansion of presidential power in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, as well as the possibility of a runaway
presidency, calls for new ways for thinking about how to
constrain the Executive. Granting the states standing to
challenge federal executive action is one avenue deserving
exploration. Expansive state standing, however, raises its
own set of concerns—including further exacerbating the
over-politicization issues that are currently plaguing both the
state offices of the attorneys general and the federal courts.
There is thus a legitimate question as to whether liberalized
state standing may raise more problems than it solves.
In this essay, we offer a modest solution. We propose the
states should not have standing to raise purely abstract issues
but that a more generous notion of injury in fact should be
applied to them than to other entities. Such an approach allows
states to maintain actions against the Executive that might
otherwise not be justiciable. We further suggest, however, even
this limited grant of standing should be subject to prudential
review because of the potential problems that expanded state
standing generates.
We end with a final word of caution from the opinion by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown that is cited at the beginning of
this essay. Although the Court in Youngstown found the
president’s action in that case to be unconstitutional, Justice
Jackson’s opinion in that case was not optimistic that the
decision would effectively constrain the Executive. As he wrote:
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to
the man who can use them.” We may say that power to legislate for
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself
can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.163

Expanded state standing to challenge federal executive
action, in short, may be warranted; but it, by itself, will not be
sufficient to seriously constrain presidential power. The broader
solutions lie elsewhere.
163

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952).

